The Group of 33 (G-33), at its
initial establishment known as the ?SP and SSM Alliance?, is a negotiating group of developing countries
established on 9 September 2003, on the eve
of the WTO Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico. Its main and strategic
objective is to ensure that the
issue of food security, rural livelihood and rural development becomes an
integral part of the agriculture negotiations - the ?engine? and central issue of the WTO Doha Development Agenda.
It endeavours to do so, under
the coordination of Indonesia,
by vigorously promoting Special and Differential Treatment through the concept
of Special Products (SP) and Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) for all
developing countries. The goal of G-33
is to have the concepts of SP and SSM embodied within the modalities of the WTO
agriculture negotiations.
The existence and role of the G-33 in the agriculture negotiations has brought
new interests, challenges and hope. It has also provoked mutual respect as well
as fierce criticism and oppositions not only from negotiating partners but from
analysts as well. However, the Group remained solid and determined since it
believes that addressing the problem of food and
livelihood security as well as rural development constitutes a concrete
expression of developing countries? ?right to development?.
Since the WTO Fifth Ministerial Conference and significantly leading up to the 2004
July Package, the G-33 progressed consistently with their ultimate agenda of SP
and SSM. A premeditated Ministerial Meeting was held in Jakarta (June 2004), which adopted a common
political platform enshrined in the G-33 Ministerial Communique. A Ministerial informal consultation has also
been convened in Dalian, China (July 2005). On a more
regular basis, Senior Officials, Heads of Delegations and technical level
meetings are continuously held in Geneva
to discuss, consolidate and materialize the Group?s concerted efforts.
The concepts of SP and SSM as
provided for in the July 2004 Framework are fundamental and are key policy
instruments for securing the survival of the vast number of small farmers and
the rural poor. In accordance with the July 2004 Framework, developing countries will
designate an appropriate number of SPs, considered
as being strategic, on the basis of food security, livelihood security and rural
development needs. Acknowledging the complex nature of these concepts it is
undoubtedly not feasible for the establishment of universal indicator for SPs.
The selection and designation of an appropriate number of SPs must be made with
a full appreciation of the domestic policy context and circumstances of
individual developing countries concerned.
The SSM is equally important for attaining
the development objectives of developing countries. SSM is needed to provide
more operationally effective remedy for developing countries against import
surges and price depressions. In line with the July framework, the SSM shall be
available to all developing countries. As a safeguard mechanism for developing
countries, the SSM must be able to respond to the needs and the particular
circumstances of individual developing countries and LDCs. Therefore, this
mechanism must take into account their institutional capacities and resources
and thus must be simple, effective and easy to implement.
It is apparent that the G-33 upholds its legitimacy due to the following
rational:
a) Agricultural sectors in most of the
developing world, in particular their ability to support their basic legitimate
development goals, such as food and livelihood security and rural development,
have been affected by the inequalities inherent to the current Agreement;
b) Since the Uruguay Round,
farmers from most of the developing countries have had to compete in their domestic markets with foreign
competitors who are supported by both trade-distorting export competition and
by domestic support measures;
c) The fact that rural and agricultural
populations typically predominate in the societies and economies of developing
countries, the latter?s agricultural systems and economies suffer from undue
stress imposed by the existing inequalities of the international trading
environment. Although developing countries each have their own limited areas of
competitiveness, trade distortions as well as other types of barriers have
either prevented the exploitation of market access benefits or shut developing
countries out of the competition altogether. The problem is compounded by the
fact that even on their own markets, the producers in developing countries are
facing increasingly difficult circumstances and impoverishment;
d) There is indeed a need for
a fundamental reform of world agricultural trade, which is seen as key to
addressing the current imbalance as well as to achieving the development
objectives and dimensions set out in the Doha Development Agenda. For
developing countries, these reforms must comprise reductions of, with a view to phasing
out all forms of export subsidies, substantial reductions in trade-distorting
domestic support and substantial improvements in market access for products of
particular interest to developing countries. Any reform to be viable, special and differential
treatment for developing countries must be an integral part of all elements of
the negotiations in order to be operational. This would also enable them to
effectively take account of their development needs, amongst them food and
livelihood security, as well as rural development.
As a logical consequence, the G-33 confirms that
for the SP and SSM provision to become effective in addressing food and livelihood security as
well as rural development, must imply the following
characteristics:
a) SP is a stand alone provision,
and not merely recognize as an additional flexibility or linked to any part of market access reduction formula;
b) No tariff reduction commitment
for all SP;
c) No new TRQ commitment on all
SP;
d) Products designated as SP must
have access to SSM;
e) Indicators based on food
security, livelihood security, and rural development needs, not to be
negotiated but as a way of transparency,
will be produced
to assist developing
countries to designate their own special products;
f) SP shall be available to all
agricultural products;
g) SSM shall be automatically
triggered;
h) SSM shall be available to all
agricultural products;
i) SSM should be available to
address situations of import surges or swings in international prices.
Therefore, price and volume-triggered
safeguards shall
be contemplated;
j) Both additional duties and
quantitative restrictions shall be envisaged as measures to provide
relief from
import surges and decline in prices;
k) The mechanism shall respond to
the institutional capabilities and resources of developing countries; hence it
should be simple, effective and easy to implement.
The distinctive negotiating role of the G-33 was also evident in the
final phase of the negotiations that led to the agreed July Framework in 2004. Within
the roadmap leading up to the Sixth WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in
December 2005 and the conclusion of the Development Round in 2006, the G-33 is
committed to pursue its common objectives and engage constructively in the
negotiations. The Group would maintain and continue to
fostering its internal coordination and close cooperation with other developing country groupings, such as
the G-20, the ACP, the African Group and LDCs.
Currently, the G-33, an alliance of a large number of developing
countries including LDCs across the continents, has 44 member countries as follows:
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, China,
Cote d?Ivoire, Congo, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica,
Kenya, Korea, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Panama, The Philippines, Peru, Saint Kitts, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad
and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. El Salvador and Guatemala joined as the most recent
members, in August 2005.
Above all, the G-33
underscores that it is indeed only through the coherent and collective spirit
and close cooperation among developing countries with a view to promoting
developing countries interests in agricultural negotiations, that the development
dimensions of the Doha Declaration can be effectively achieved.